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The Trigger Price Mechanism: 
Limitation on Administrative Discretion 
under the Antidumping Laws 
The world steel market, Jong subject to cyclical fluctuations, is pres-
ently faced with a severe problem of overproduction. United States pro-
ducers of steel in particular have suffered difficulties in the current crisis. 1 
While the industry's problems are not new, conditions of slack demand 
and overcapacity have recently resulted in the implementation of a new 
system to administer the antidumping Jaws of the United States to curb 
imports of foreign-produced steel. This article will describe and evaluate 
this new system, the trigger price mechanism (TPM), and consider its role 
as a constraint on the administrative discretion of the United States De-
partment of the Treasury. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY 
World raw steel production has grown rapidly in the postwar years, ris-
ing from a total of approximately 207 million net tons in 1950 to 783 mil-
lion net tons in 1974. At the same time, the share of production attributa-
ble to United States producers has steadily eroded from forty-seven per-
cent to seventeen percent.2 While steel making capacity is dispersed 
throughout the world, production remains concentrated in the more de-
veloped economies. The USSR, the United States, the European Com-
munities (EC), and Japan produce about three-fourths of the world's raw 
steel. 3 
Domestic consumers are the dominant purchasers of United States-
produced steel. Because of the size of the American market, however, 
this country has been a target of exports by foreign producers. 4 Imports of 
'N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1977, at 51, col. 4. 
2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUS-
TRY AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RIVALS: TRENDS AND FACTORS DETERMINING INTERNA-
TIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 5-6 (Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FTC STAFF REPORT). 
3 The United States accounted for approximately one-half of the total world steel produc-
tion in 1950, but only about one-sixth in 1976. In that year, the U.S.S.R. produced 147 mil-
lion metric tons of raw steel, followed by the United States with production of 116 million 
tons, and Japan with 107 million metric tons. The countries of the European Communities 
(EC), together, produced 134 million metric tons of steel. Id. at 6-8. From 1955 to 1976, raw 
steel production increased by only 9% in the United States, compared to 84% in the EC and 
1,038% in Japan. THE COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT ON PRICES AND COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY 8 (Nov. 1977) [here-
inafter cited as COWPS REPORT). 
•FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
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raw steel rose from 1.5 percent of apparent United States consumption of 
steel in 1957 to almost eighteen percent in 1977.5 Over the same time 
period, American industry employment fell from more than 500,000 
hourly workers to fewer than 370,000.6 Moreover, domestic production 
has grown at a far smaller rate than the world average. 7 Clearly, the Unit-
ed States steel industry is undergoing a relative contraction. This conclu-
sion does not prove, however, that these economic dislocations have 
been caused by anything more than normal competitive processes. 
There are several possible explanations of the difficulties faced by the 
United States steel industry. Critical observers of the industry, after exam-
ining the historical increase in steel imports, argue that the continuing 
loss of domestic market share is due to the relative efficiency of foreign 
steelmakers and the willingness of foreign steel exporters to price in a 
flexible manner. 8 It is also claimed that poor management of United 
States steel producers has contributed to this erosion of market share. 9 
This line of reasoning suggests that increased imports are a reflection of 
worldwide price competition and will bring positive benefits to American 
consumers. 
Management and labor union spokesmen contend, however, that the 
steel industry's problems are the result of both excessive federal regula-
tion and unfair international trade practices, principally dumping. 10 
Dumping is the sale in the United States of foreign products below "fair 
value," normally measured by the home market prices of the exporting 
producer, which injures or is likely to injure a domestic industry .11 
Domestic steel firms have filed an unprecedented number of petitions12 
under the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended,13 asking for relief from 
5See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 70 (Table 2.24: Growth Trends in Production, 
Shipments, Imports and Exports of Steel Mill Products: 1950-1976), and INTERAGENCY 
TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR THE STEEL 
INDUSTRY 9 (December 6, I 977) [hereinafter cited as Solomon Report], [reprinted in Admin-
istration's Comprehensive Program For The Steel Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-38 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings]. The negotiation of Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRA) with 
the major Japanese and EC steel producers for tonnage limits on exports from 1969 through 
1974, discussed in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975), renders these numbers inadequate for determining 
the potential foreign penetration of the U.S. market. 
"Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 3. 
7FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. 
"Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 10. 
"But see FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 472-512, and particularly the conclusions at 
528-30. 
10Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 10. 
"See text accompanying notes 21-39 infra for a fuller discussion of the statutory elements 
of an antidumping violation. 
12See, e.g., notices of Treasury Department investigations, prompted by petition, cover-
ing carbon steel plate from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 16,883 (Mar. 30, 1977), welded stainless steel 
pipe and tubing from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 16,883 (Mar. 30, 1977), steel wire strand for pre-
stressed concrete from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,034 (Nov. 23, 1977), and cold rolled and gal-
vanized carbon steel sheets from Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,348-54 (Dec. 2, 1977). 
' 3 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-172 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
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these practices. They contend that the dramatic surge in imports, from 
14.3 percent in 1976 to almost eighteen percent in 197714 cannot be ex-
plained as a competitive response to market conditions, since growth of 
United States demand for steel and United States prices have increased 
only gradually. Further, they argue that maintenance of full employment 
in Western Europe and Japan is considered a fundamental social policy. 15 
Consequently, unlike the United States where labor lay-offs and contrac-
tions are more common, labor in the EC and Japan is a fixed cost of pro-
duction. When overcapacity and slack demand press upon foreign steel 
firms, their response allegedly is to find additional markets16 by selling 
below average production costs, thereby leading U.S. purchasers to 
switch to foreign producers of steel. The result of this dumping is to shift 
the unemployment burden from foreign firms to United States steel 
firms. 17 
The antidumping laws may be employed to protect consumers against a 
loss in economic welfare as well as to shield American industries by erect-
ing protective barriers to imports. Dumping by a foreign producer can 
harm consumers in two circumstances. The first of these is monopoliza-
tion of the import market by a foreign concern through predatory pric-
ing, 18 and the second is temporary exportation of products at below cost 
by the foreign firm to maintain production and employment at home. 19 In 
either case, artificially low prices may force domestic producers out of 
business and may reduce the available supply of the product to consumers 
over the long run.20 
II. UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING LAW 
The Antidumping Act of 1921,21 administered by the Treasury Depart-
ment, has provided the primary basis for the American response to the 
recent increase in steel imports. 22 In proscribing dumping, the Act au-
thorizes the imposition of customs duties equal to the margin of dumping 
found upon final determination that the law has been violated. 23 The 
14FfC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 70 and Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 9. 
15See, e.g., Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, Inc;, Economics of International Steel Trade: Pol-
icy Implications for the United States 16 (May 1977) (report to the American Iron and Steel 
Institute). 
16/d. at 18. 
17See, e.g.,Hearings, supra note 5, at 226 (Statement of Hon. Ralph Regula). 
18 See W. Wares, An Evaluation of the Provisions and Recent Administrative History of 
the United States Antidumping Act of 1921, at 190-95 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 
in the University of Michigan Economics Department). 
19/d. at 183-90. 
20If supply is restricted while consumer demand remains unrestrained, it is evident that 
purchasers will be forced to pay higher prices for the product. 
21 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-172 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Act was extensively amended by 
§ 321 of the 1974 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (Jan. 3, 1975) [hereinafter 
cited as 1974 Trade Act]. 
22Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 4. See also note 12 supra. 
23 19 u.s.c. § 161 (1970). 
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Treasury Department, at its discretion, may initiate an antidumping inves-
tigation. 24 When complaints are initiated by private parties, however, it 
must determine within thirty days whether to begin an investigation.25 
Once an investigation is undertaken, the Treasury Department must de-
termine if sales of the foreign-produced good in U.S. markets are at "less 
than fair value" (LTFV). 26 In making this evaluation, the Treasury com-
pares the "purchase price" or "exporter's sales price" with one of three 
standards measuring foreign value. The difference constitutes the "mar-
gin of dumping. " 27 When the U.S. importer and the foreign exporter are 
unrelated, the Antidumping Act requires the Treasury to rely for its calcu-
lations on the "purchase price," defined as the price at which the import-
er purchased the merchandise plus any other costs normally included in 
the factory price.28 If the U.S. importer is commercially related to the 
foreign exporter, the Act substitutes a determination of the "exporter's 
sales price" as the appropriate standard. This is essentially the price at 
which the American importer resells the article in the domestic market, 
adjusted to arrive at a calculated net f.o.b. factory price.29 
Once the purchase or exporter's sales price has been calculated, it is 
compared against one of three standards of foreign value. In calculating 
the foreign market value of American imports, the Treasury is directed to 
use the home-market price of that good whenever possible. 30 If the 
home-market price cannot be ascertained, foreign market value is com-
puted from the price of goods exported to third-party countries. 31 Where 
home-market and third-party prices are less than the exporter's cost of 
production, the Treasury uses a "constructed value" in conducting an-
tidumping inquiries. 32 "Constructed value" is the sum of the costs of 
materials, fabrication and processing, packing, and general expenses and 
profits. The statute mandates minimum levels for general expenses and 
profits of 10 percent and 8 percent, respectively, of the cost of materials, 
fabrication and processing. 33 Upon determination of the foreign market 
value, the Treasury compares it with the purchase or exporter's sale price 
to arrive at the margin of dumping. 
The Treasury is required to issue a Tentative Determination within nine 
months after a full-scale investigation has begun. 34 If the Tentative De-
termination indicates that sales L TFV are likely to be found, the Treasury 
must suspend customs value appraisal on the merchandise in question. 35 
24 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
25 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(l) (Supp. V 1975). 
26 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
27 19 u.s.c. § 161 (1970). 
28 19 U.S.C. § 162 (Supp. V 1975). 
29 19 U.S.C. § 163 (Supp. V 1975). 
3019 U.S.C. § 164(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
31/d. 
32 19 U.S.C. § 164(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
33 19 U .S.C. § 165(a) (1970). 
34 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). 
35 19 U .S.C. § 160 (b)(l)(b) (Supp. V 1975). Customs appraisal is the practice of assessing 
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Such merchandise may thereafter be imported only if covered by a bond 
equal to the tentative margin of dumping.36 Following publication of the 
Tentative Determination, all interested parties may make written and oral 
representations before a Final Determination is announced. 37 If theFinal 
Determination, which must be made within 90 days of the Tentative De-
termination, is affirmative, the case is referred to the U.S. International 
Trade Commission (ITC) to determine whether the LTFV sales have 
caused or are likely to cause injury to a domestic industry. 38 If the ITC 
finds such irtjury, the Treasury publishes a dumping finding and assesses 
antidumping duties equal to the final margin of dumping on all imports as 
to which appraisal was withheld and on all further imports of the product 
sold at dumping margins. 39 The entire administrative process generally 
consumes thirt~en months. 40 The prospect of judicial review, which may 
focus on only the LTFV determination, further extends this time period. 
Ill. INADEQUACIES OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT 
The existing scheme for enforcing the Antidumping Act suffers from 
three primary deficiencies: the cumbersome nature of the procedure, the 
specific product orientation of investigations and remedies, and the 
Treasury's unbridled investigatory discretion. Commentary on the insuf-
ficiency of antidumping provisions has focused on the time consuming as-
pect of the procedure.41 Enforcement procedures, from drafting of the 
complaint through imposition of a dumping duty, require sixteen to seven-
teen months to complete. 42 Judicial intervention after completion of ad-
ministrative action may further delay final relief. Consequently, sudden 
surges of "dumped" imports can entirely evade action by the Treasury. 
Where dumping is predicated on short-term exporting designed to main-
tain production and employment, the practical inability to reach tempor-
ary conduct may render the Act ineffective.43 
the value of an article for the purpose of computing an ad valorem tariff on importing the 
article. 
36 19 C.F.R. §§ 153. 50-153.51 (1977). The effect of requiring that bond be posted has been 
described as potentially "devastating." Fisher, The Anti dumping Law of the United States: 
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAW & PoL. INT'L Bus. 85, 96 (1973). 
37 19 U.S.C. § 160(d)(I) (Supp. V 1975). Prior to the 1974 Trade Act revision, 
§ 32l(a)(2)(d)(l), opportunity to make a presentation was at the discretion of the Secretary 
of the Treasury. See Fisher, supra note 36, at 96. 
38 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
3919 U.S.C. §§ 160(a), 161 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
• 0Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12. 
0 See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12. 
• 2This estimate includes the time necessary for preparation of a complaint. Transcript of 
Department of the Treasury Press Conference by Robert W. Crandall and Peter D. 
Ehrenhaft at 25-26 (Jan. 3, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Treasury Press Conference]: 
Question: How long is it likely to take American producers to follow a dumping 
case all the way through the ITC and to the end? 
Mr. Ehrenhaft: The average time today is 13 months following the filing of the 
complaint, but if you add to that the time that it takes to prepare the complaints, 
probably it takes 16, 17 months. This is intended to compress that significantly. 
43Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12. 
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Unfair product sales designed to monopolize the import market must 
occur on a continuing basis, however, and therefore would seem to be 
within the reach of enforcement efforts. The problem remains, neverthe-
less, because antidumping investigations and remedies concentrate on 
specific products. Complaints may be brought only with respect to 
specific types of merchandise, and only specific products are subject to 
the Act's remedies. 44 Foreign producers intent on continuing unlawful 
imports can easily shift to a related product which is outside the scope of 
the investigation and persist in unfair price discrimination between na-
tional markets. 45 Only recently have domestic steel producers attempted 
to combat this practice by filing a battery of antidumping petitions cover-
ing a broad range of steel products. 
The Treasury also has been criticized for exercising its discretion in ini-
tiating investigations to avoid antagonizing foreign governments. Until 
the advent of the 1974 amendments, it is alleged, the Treasury consis-
tently refused to press antidumping investigations that might affect sensi-
tive trade relations with other countries. 46 While this exercise of discre-
tion was circumscribed by the introduction of maximum time limits on 
procedural steps in 1974, including a requirement that the Treasury either 
begin an investigation or refuse to do so within thirty days of receiving a 
complaint,47 the discretion of the Treasury to initiate and carry through to 
completion antidumping prosecutiol!s remains relatively unhampered.48 
The strong response of domestic steel producers to the influx of imports 
into the American market, including the filing of numerous antidumping 
complaints, led to the formation of an Interagency Task Force on Steel by 
the Carter Administration in late 1977. In the report by the Task Force to 
the President, 49 popularly known as the Solomon Report, a policy pro-
gram for relief of the United States steel industry was developed. While 
the Solomon Report recommends a series of measures to deal with long 
term problems of the industry, including modernization and environmen-
tal regulation,50 the centerpiece of the program is a system of trigger 
44 19 U.S.C.§§ 160(a) and 16l(a) authorize imposition of dumping duties only on those 
products subject to a specific investigation. The Treasury Department may not, for example, 
impose dumping duties on steel wire based on an affirmative finding of dumping with respect 
to steel tubin$, Consequently, the Department must investigate both products. See the 
notices of antldumping investigations m 42 Fed. Reg. 60,034 (Nov. 23, 1977) (steel wire 
strand for prestressed concrete) and 42 Fed. Reg. 16,883 (Mar. 30, 1977) (steel pipe and tub-
ing), as an example of investigations into related products. 
45Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 13. 
46Samuelson, The Anti-Dumping Laws-Rx for the Steel Industry, 9 NAT'L J. 1636, 1637 
(1977). 
47 1974 Trade Act, § 32l(a), 19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975). 
48The 1974 amendments set maximum time limits on the various procedural seps in a 
Treasury Department investigation, provide for notice through publication of all major 
Treasury actions, and provide an opportunity for manufacturers, importers and exporters to 
demand a hearing prior to a Final Determination. See 1974 Trade Act,§ 321(a), 19 U.S.C. 
§ 160 (Supp. V 1975). 
49Solomon Report, supra note 5. 
50The Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 21-35, proposed, inter a/ia, reducing the 
guidelines for useful life depreciation of new steel industry machinery and equipment under 
I.R.C. § 167(m) from 18 to 15 years, additional funds be made available for industrial loan 
guarantees, providing funds for assistance to individuals, business and public services in 
communities hit hard by steel-related unemployment, and support for conversion of aban-
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prices for monitoring steel import prices and for initiating antidumping in-
vestigations. 51 Acting under the authority of Section 20l(a) of the An-
tidumping Act of 1921, as amended,52 the Treasury Department im-
plemented the trigger price system recommended in the Solomon Re-
port. sa 
IV. THE TRIGGER PRICE SYSTEM 
A. Operation of the TPM 
The TPM consists of four parts: 54 
(1) the identification and publication of trigger prices for steel 
products imported in the United States; 
(2) the adoption of a special Summary Steel Invoice for use by 
the Customs Service in administering the trigger price system; 
(3) the continuous collection and analysis of information on the 
cost of production and the prices of steel products in the princi-
pal countries of export for use in calculating the trigger prices, 
and information on the condition of the United States steel in-
dustry; and 
(4) the expedited administration of antidumping proceedings for 
imports below the levels set by the trigger prices. 
The system, as discussed below, is a self-imposed restraint on the Treas-
ury Department's discretion to initiate enforcement activities under the 
Antidumping Act. This restraint on investigatory and prosecutorial dis-
cretion is accompanied by public guidelines, the trigger prices them-
selves, which place foreign producers on notice as to how the Treasury 
will exercise its discretion in targeting steel imports for investigation. 
The trigger prices are calculated from the estimated cost of steel pro-
duction in the most efficient exporting country, currently Japan, based on 
the best evidence available. 55 Profit and general expense factors, as well 
as appropriate capital charges, are incorporated in the cost of production. 
doned steel facilities into alternative uses. In the area of environmental regulation, the Re-
port urged better coordination between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration, and a continuing dialogue with the steel indus-
try. 
51Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 13-20. 
52 19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975). 
5343 Fed. Reg. 1464 (Jan. 9, 1978). 
5442 Fed. Reg. 65,214, 65,215 (Dec. 30, 1977) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. Part 141) (Pro-
posed Amendments to the Customs Regulations Relating to the Documents and Information 
Required to be Filed at the Time of Importation of Certain Articles of Steel). 
55 ln the course of publishing the base prices for certain imports of steel mill products, 43 
Fed. Reg. 1464 (Jan. 9, 1978), the Treasury Department discussed at length the methodology 
it used for constructing the trigger prices. The methodology is similar to that used in the 
COWPS Report, supra note 3, but the product coverage is different. In addition, the esti-
mated costs of production constructed for use in the TPM are based primarily on informa-
tion from the large, integrated Japanese steelmakers. This date was supplied to the Treasury 
by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The CO WPS REPORT conclu-
sions are based on average cost data for the Japanese steel industry as a whole. 43 Fed. Reg. 
at 1464. 
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Importation costs, excluding tariffs, are then added to the calculated cost 
of production to arrive at the Treasury trigger price. Trigger prices have 
been established for a number of specified categories of raw steel prod-
ucts, but fabricated steel articles are not covered by the system.56 
Imports below the level of the trigger price are subject to an antidump-
ing investigation conducted by the Treasury. 57 Because the information 
used in constructing the trigger prices will be used in steel antidumping 
investigations, the Solomon Report contemplates an expedited investiga-
tion. Whereas de novo examinations take thirteen months or more, the 
Report suggests that the Treasury will complete most steel cases iden-
tified by the TPM within ninety days. 58 Once a Tentative Determination 
of dumping has been reached, withholding of appraisal may be imposed 
retroactively under existing authority. 59 Upon a Final Determination, the 
case is referred to the ITC for what the Task Force clearly hoped will be a 
similarly expedited injury determination. 60 
The TPM is in form exclusively a procedure allowing the Treasury De-
partment to initiate and expedite an investigation, without the impetus of 
a private industry petition, into sales of foreign steel products which may 
have been made at an LTFV price. The trigger price system merely iden-
tifies those cases in which the Treasury will initiate an investigation, and 
since such self-initiation is presently a matter of de facto administrative 
discretion,61 the implementation of the system does not affect the legal 
rights of private parties under the Antidumping Act. 62 Foreign firms, of 
course, may still contest an LTFV determination by the Treasury. 63 
Where the Treasury does not initiate an investigation because the mer-
chandise in question entered the United States at a price above the rele-
vant trigger, domestic firms may file a complaint with the Treasury re-
questing an investigation. 64 In such cases, where sales at LTFV have oc-
curred but are above the trigger price, the domestic firm is likely to en-
counter difficulty in proving the requisite "injury" before the ITC. 65 In 
proposing the trigger system, the Solomon Report accepted the United 
States industry position that domestic firms are fully competitive with· 
foreign producers where sales are not made below the actual cost of pro-
56See U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, Trigger Price Mechanism: 
Questions and Answers, Attachment 3 (Feb. 10, 1978). Domestic steel fabricatoi:s are ex-
pected to seek trigger pricing protection. The Opposition Grows to Reference Pricing.Bus. 
WEEK, April 10, 1978 at 30. The program included 17 steel mill products when it was first set 
up, but has since swollen to 84 products. Tarnished Shield: 'Trigger-Price' System to Help 
Steel Industry Triggers Much Dismay, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1978, at l, 19 col. I. 
57See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 16. 
58Jd. 
59Authority for retroactive withholding of appraisal currently exists under 19 C.F.R. 
§ 153.34(a) (1977). 
• 0solomon Report, supra note 5, at 16. 
"'See note 24 and accompanying text, supra. 
62Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 14. The point is reemphasized in 43 Fed. Reg. 1464, 
1468 (Jan. 9,1978). 
6319 U.S.C. § 1514 (1970). 
6419 u.s.c. § 1516 (Supp. V 1975). 
65See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 18. 
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duction for the most efficient Japanese steel makers. So Jong as steel 
prices remain at or above this level, the United States industry position is 
that domestic products are capable of meeting international competition. 
Following that argument to its conclusion, it is clear that sales by a foreign 
producer, which are below that firm's cost of production but above the 
cost of production for the most efficient Japanese firms presently em-
ployed as a base for the trigger prices, will not be found by the ITC to 
have injured the domestic industry. 66 In drafting the TPM, the Task Force 
contemplated that steel antidumping cases not initiated by the Treasury 
under the new system would be a waste of both public and private re-
sources. Consequently, steel producers who are Jess efficient than the 
Japanese, such as the Western European concerns, will be effectively in-
sulated from prosecution under the Antidumping Act. 67 
B. TPM as Administrative Rulemaking: 
Procedural Requirements and Judicial 
Review 
In administering the Antidurnping Act, the Treasury was faced with a 
choice between establishing a pattern of enforcement emerging out of a 
succession of investigations and determinations, and creating a bright-line 
standard of behavior embodied in specific trigger prices. By adopting the 
TPM, the Treasury effectively promulgated a "rule" governing its discre-
tion, primarily to ensure a solution to the three problems of the statutory 
enforcement scheme noted above. The procedure should become Jess 
cumbersome, since use of data collected as part of the procedure for 
maintaining the trigger prices will replace the prior time-consuming, 
case-by-case collection of data. 68 By establishing a series of prices cover-
""See Treasury Press Conference, supra note 42, at 20.21; Transcript of White House 
Briefing by Anthony M. Solomon, Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs 4 
(Dec. 6, 1977). 
670n December 2, 1977, the Treasury published notices of initiation of antidumping inves-
tigations into cold rolled and galvanized carbon steel sheets produced in the major EC coun-
tries. 42 Fed. Reg. 61,348-54 (Dec, 2, 1977). On June 8 of the following year, the Treasury 
announced that an L TFV determination as to these imports "cannot reasonably be made in 
six months" and extended its investigatory period for an additional three months pursuant to 
§ 20J(b)(2) of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § J60(b)(2). 43 Fed. Reg. 24,933 (June 8, 1978). 
By way of comparison, the Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 16, contemplated a 90-day 
investigatory period. Finally, on August 15 the petitioner withdrew its request for an investi-
gation and the investigation was terminated without prejudice. 43 Fed. Reg. 37 ,052 (August 
21, 1978). 
68Cf. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 415. U.S. 951 (1974), where the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the authority of the FTC to promulgate Trade Regulation Rules giving greater specificity to 
the statutory standard of conduct proscribing "unfair methods of competition in commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." As Judge J. Skelly Wright, speaking 
for the majority, noted: 
Without the rule, the Commission might well be obliged to prove and argue [that 
the same activity] in each particular case was likely to have injurious and unfair 
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ing a broad spectrum of products, the Treasury also expects to prevent 
evasion of antidumping enforcement by foreign enterprises which previ-
ously switched to unscrutinized products when appraised of an antidump-
ing investigation. 69 Finally, by promulgating and publishing the trigger 
prices, the Treasury circumscribes its own investigatory and prosecutori-
al .discretion. 70 
The analogy between the TPM and regulatory rules, however, is in-
complete in two respects. 71 In the first place, promulgation of the 
mechanism by the Treasury did not include the usual procedural require-
ments for rulemaking72 because the TPM was considered exempt from the 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In addition to 
falling within the express foreign affairs exemption to the APA, 73 the trig-
ger price system was exempted from the APA because it was promulgated 
under a finding of' 'good cause ... that notice and public procedure ... 
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. " 74 The 
basis for this finding by the Treasury is, however, questionable. While 
expediting implementation of the TPM may be a laudable goal, it cannot 
successfully be distinguished from similar goals in a wide variety of gov-
ernment programs clearly subject to APA procedures. Indeed, the only 
effects on consumers or competition. Since this laborious process might well have 
to be repeated every time the Commission chose to proceed subsequently against 
another defendant on the same ground, the difference in administrative efficiency 
between the two kinds of proceedings is obvious. Furthermore, rules, as contrasted 
with the holdings reached by case-by-case adjudication, are more specific as to 
their scope, and industry compliance is more likely simply because each company 
is on clearer notice whether or not specific rules apply to it. 
482 F.2d at 690-91. On the basis of determining that the use of rules, as opposed to case-by-
case adjudication, reduced delay significantly, Judge Wright further concluded that the use 
of rules minimizes the "opportunity to tum litigation into a profitable and lengthy game." 
Id. at 691. As noted previously, one of the major criticisms of enforcement of the Antidump-
ing Act has been the long delay between violation and remedy. See text accompanying notes 
41-43 supra. 
69The system chosen by the Treasury does not preclude a switch from raw steel products 
to fabricated steel products. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 186, 187 (Testimony of John H. 
Lyons, General President, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental 
Iron Workers) and text accompanying note 130 infra. 
10See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY l ll-16 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE) and text accompanying notes 149-157 infra. 
71Both elements, the opportunity to be heard and the right to judicial review, discussed at 
text accompanying notes 72-76 irifra, were taken by Judge Wright to be important protec-
tions against the arbitrary exercise of rulemaking in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. 
FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
72Administrative Procedure Act,§ 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). 
73Section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), provides in pertinentpart: "(a) This section 
applies according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there is involved--(!) a. 
military or foreign affairs function of the United States." For a critical discussion of this 
exemption, see Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rulemaking under the APA, 
71 MICH. L. REV. 221 (1972). 
74APA § 4(a) 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B). Invocation of the "good cause exemption, how-
ever, requires that the finding of good cause and a brief statement of reasons be incorporated 
in the rules issue. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 139 (3d ed. 1972). The Treas-
ury Department finding, 43 Fed. Reg. 6065 (Feb. 13, 1978), is a seven-line conclusory state-
ment which may not meet the intent behind the requirement of a finding. 
SPRING 1978] Trigger Price Mechanism 453 
rationale for swift initiation of the TPM is the exigencies of international 
trade disputes, and it is on this ground that the foreign affairs exemption is 
based. 75 
Because the effectiveness of the TPM depends on the prices at which 
the triggers are set, public participation in agency decisionmaking on this 
issue is of signal importance. Although the Treasury provided notice and 
an opportunity for comment by interested parties in advance of the TPM's 
implementation, 76 it did not provide for public participation prior to an-
nouncing the methodology for calculating the trigger prices and the prices 
themselves. 77 The effectiveness of the TPM in regulating steel imports 
will, of course, depend on the accuracy with which the prices are calcu-
lated. While the concept of the TPM may have received formal public 
scrutiny, its implementation has not, suggesting that the APA's goal of 
effective public participation in agency decisionmaking may not have 
been realized by Treasury procedures. 78 
There is a second, and more significant difference between the TPM 
and regulatory rules. Final agency actions, including rules, are subject to 
judicial review in the absence of an expression of contrary congressional 
purpose. 79 The promulgation of the TPM, by contrast, may be insulated 
from review prior to enforcement. The TPM is designed not to affect the 
legal rights of any party under the Antidumping Act but rather to con-
strain the Treasury's decisions to initiate investigations. The exercise of 
discretionary authority to decline to investigate is traditionally protected 
against judicial review ,80 and has in fact not yet been subjected to review 
in antidumping cases.81 If a discretionary refusal to investigate is unre-
75See note 73 supra. 
16See 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214 (Dec. 30, 1977) (Proposed Amendments to the Customs Regula-
tions Relating to the Documents and Information to be Filed at the Time of Importation of 
Certain Articles of Steel). 
11See 43 Fed. Reg. 1464, 1469 (Jan. 9, 1978) and 43 Fed. Reg. 4703 (Feb. 3, 1978), in which 
methodology and particular prices were announced without prior comment by interested 
parties. 
78 ln discussing whether reviewing courts should require notice and comment procedure 
for rulemaking exempt from the APA, Davis argues that the courts should undertake this 
function where the impact of administrative action is "substantial." K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 193-202 (1976). Because the TPM reallocates economic 
opportunity among interested parties, the use of a notice and comment procedure by the 
Treasury would meet this policy interest in ensuring fairness of administrative actions. See 
text accompanying notes 124-131 supra. 
79 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
8°K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 518 (3d ed. 1972). The principle ofunreviewa-
bility is strongest in the area of criminal law, see, e.g., Newman v. U.S., 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.), but is slowly being replaced by judicial protection against abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion in civil cases. See De Vito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969) 
(requiring the Secretary of Labor to furnish a written statement of reasons for refusing to 
initiate a proceeding to set aside the results of a contested union election.) Davis argues 
strongly that the judiciary should review the exercise of executive discretion to check 
abuses. DAVIS, supra note 78, at 518-23. See also, Wright, Review: Beyond Discretionary 
Justice, 81 YALE L. J. 575 (1972). 
81But cf. National Milk Producers Federation v. Shultz, 372 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1974) 
(authorizing district court jurisdiction of a mandamus action against the Secretary of the 
Treasury for failing to initiate a countervailing duty investigation, and noting that mandamus 
will lie only where a duty to act is shown). Countervailing duty actions and antidumping 
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viewable, then it necessarily follows that internal criteria for exercising 
that discretion are equally insulated without regard to whether they have 
been published or subject to public scrutiny. In Abbott Laboratories v. 
Gardner, 82 however, the Supreme Court noted that judicial review is pre-
sumed available under the APA to one "suffering legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within 
the meaning of a relevant statute," so long as review is not precluded by 
statute or the action is not committed by law to agency discretion. 83 
A strong argument may be made that judicial review of antidumping ac-
tions is limited by statute solely to scrutiny of LTFV determinations and 
does not extend to the bases for investigations. In authorizing domestic 
producers to challenge Negative Final Determinations in court in the 1974 
Trade Act,84 Congress stated that it was extending domestic producers 
rights equal to those already held by foreign producers. 85 The subject of 
such judicial review is explicitly limited to "a determination by the Secre-
tary ... that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is not being, nor likely 
to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair val~e. " 86 and therefore 
does not seem to include administrative actions short of such an L TFV 
determination. 
The· 1974 congressional enactments on judicial review in antidumping 
cases were in response to the 1971 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA) decision in United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc. 81 In 
Hammond Lead, the CCPA reversed a decision of the Customs Court 
sustaining a protest under the countervailing duty laws by an American 
manufacturer of litharge, a lead oxide used in storage batteries. The 
manufacturer had filed a complaint asserting that the government of 
Mexico was subsidizing the export of litharge to the United States88 in 
contravention of the proscription against "any bounty or grant upon the 
manufacture or production or export of any article. " 89 The Commissioner 
of Customs, acting for the Treasury, declined to impose a countervailing 
duty on Mexican litharge, whereupon the manufacturer brought suit in the 
United States Customs Court under section 516(b) of the Tariff Act of 
1930.90 The Customs Court found that jurisdiction existed to hear the pro-
test91 and sustained the manufacturer's protest on the merits.92 
The CCPA reversed, holding that the Customs Court lacked the right to 
review an American manufacturer's protest of a negative countervailing 
actions are both reviewable under the same statutol)' provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970 & 
Supp. V 1975). 
82387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
83/d. at 140. 
841974 Trade Act,§ 321(0(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (Supp. V 1975). 
85S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & Ao. 
NEWS 7186, 7314-15. 
861974 Trade Act,§ 321(0(l)(d)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d)(l) (Supp. V 1975). 
87440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). 
88/d. at 1025. 
89TarifI Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970). 
90440 F.2d at 1025. 
9161 Cust. Ct. 137, C.D. 3552 (1968). 
9263 Cust. Ct. 316, C.D. 3915 (1969). 
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duty determination under section 516.93 Because antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty determinations were and are reviewable under the same 
statutory sections, the decision implied the denial of review of negative 
antidumping determinations as well. Despite an opinion prepared by the 
General Counsel of the Treasury Department contending that review of 
negative antidumping determinations was still available in spite of Ham-
mond Lead, the Congress approved legislation confirming this right on 
the ground that "the law ought to be specific on this point. " 94 The con-
gressional purpose in enacting the 1974 provisions on judicial review was 
therefore to overrule Hammond Lead in the area of countervailing duties 
and to confirm its inapplicability to negative antidumping determinations. 
The history of the 1974 Trade Act thus appears to evidence a congres-
sional intent to confirm judicial review of LTFV determinations, both 
positive and negative, but does not indicate a desire to subject administra-
tive actions short of an L TFV determination to judicial scrutiny. 
The language of the Antidumping Act, while placing limits on adminis-
trative enforcement, does not explicitly state that enforcement is commit-
ted by law to agency discretion. As the Supreme Court has explained in 
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 95 in the absence of an express prohibition of judi-
cial review, a federal agency will bear "the heavy burden of overcoming 
the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial 
review of [its] decision. " 96 · 
In the face of this strong presumption of review ability, it is unlikely that 
the courts will find the Treasury's decision to refrain from investigation to 
be discretionary and free from review. Moreover, review ability of pre-
enforcement administrative action is not limited to a choice between a 
mandatory duty to investigate and unreviewable discretion to refuse. Ju-
dicial scrutiny may extend to questions of whether the administrative de-
cision was arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with 
law. 97 In the course of its decision, the Abbou court cited legislative his-
tory of the APA for the standard precluding pre-enforcement review: "A 
statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give 
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. " 98 While the 
preceding analysis of the legislative history argues against pre-
enforcement reviewability of the TPM, the Abbott standard of clear and 
convincing evidence may prove too heavy a burden of persuasion, and 
invite a reviewing court to examine the TPM when faced with allegations 
of arbitrary exercise of discretion. 
93440 F.2d at 1027, 1030-31. The CCPA was clearly influenced by its determination that 
assessment of countervailing duties "necessarily involves judgments in the political, legisla-
tive or policy spheres." Id. at 1030. 
94S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 7186, 7314-15. 
95421 u .s. 560 (1975). 
96/d. at 567. 
97 A.P.A. § lO(e)(B)(I), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See also Wong Wing Hang v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966); De Vito v. Shultz, 300 F. 
Supp. 381, 383 (D.D.C. 1969). 
98387 U.S. at 14 n.2, citing H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946). 
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Even if pre-enforcement judicial review is not precluded, courts may 
refrain from examining the Treasury's pre-enforcement actions if they 
find that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial evaluation.99 In Ab-
bott, once reviewability was established, the court required the challenger 
to show that he would suffer hardship if pre-enforcement review were de-
nied and that judicial resolution of the issues was appropriate at that 
time. 10° Companion cases to Abbott 101 concerning pre-enforcement chal-
lenges of FDA action further demonstrate that the doctrine of "ripeness" 
is a barrier to initiating judicial review separate from the problem of re-
viewability. 
There are three elements that must be balanced in deciding whether a 
controversy is ripe for judicial review: fitness of issues for judicial resolu-
tion, hardship to the parties resulting from deferral of review until en-
forcement occurs, and finality of the agency action. 102 The issue of fitness 
pertains not to the declaration of the rights of individual parties but to the 
administration of the judicial process and the proper separation of pow-
ers.103 Consequently, the decision as to pre-enforcement review may tum 
on whether the issues brought before the court are strictly legal, thus im-
plicating questions of the relationship between the coordinate branches of 
government, or are interwoven with factual disputes concerning the rights 
of individuals. In Abbott, the Supreme Court found the issue fit for judi-
cial resolution because inter alia the parties agreed that the issue was 
"purely legal."104 The TPM, if challenged on pre-enforcement review, 
presents both legal and factual issues: whether the trigger mechanism may 
properly be limited to the specified categories of raw steel mill products, 
whether calculation of the trigger prices themselves was properly made, 
and whether the Treasury exceeded its statutory authority in promulgat-
ing the TPM.105 
••vining, Direct Judicial Review and The Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 
MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1495 (1%9). Professor Vining charitably described the doctrine as an 
"anomaly" and "curiously atavistic." Id. 
100387 U.S. at 148-49. As described by the Court, the basic rationale of the ripeness doc-
trine is to prevent courts from becoming entangled in abstract disagreements over adminis-
trative policies, and to protect agencies from judicial interference until "an administrative 
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging par-
ties." Id. 
101 In Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967) [Toilet Goods I] and Gardner v. 
Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967) [Toilet Goods II], the Court applied the doctrine of 
ripeness in cases where judicial review of FDA action was clearly authorized. In Toilet 
Goods I, pre-enforcement review of an FDA regulation was held inappropriate because the 
challenged regulations did not affect the primary conduct of petitioners and only minimal 
adverse consequences would occur if review were delayed until after enforcement. 387 U.S. 
at 164-66. In Toilet Goods II, the same Court compelled pre-enforcement review because the 
petitioner would risk criminal charges, seizure of the goods, or injunctions by' challenging 
the regulations after enforcement. 387 U.S. at 172. See Vining, supra note 99, at 1499-1500. 
102National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
'
03ld. at 695. 
104387 U.S. at 149. 
100See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary In-
junction, Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, Civil Action No.78-0421, (D.D.C. 1978) [here-
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Potential challengers face a lesser barrier in proving that hardship to the 
parties is caused by deferring judicial consideration of the TPM until the 
Treasury takes enforcement actions .106 Both domestic steel fabricators 
and foreign producers of raw steel will suffer injury from the imposition of 
the TPM as a consequence of the "minimum price" effects of the sys-
tem.107 Once the trigger prices are published, foreign steel enterprises will 
raise their prices in conformity with the triggers and domestic fabricators 
who rely on foreign-produced raw steel will face an immediate rise in their 
raw material costs. Moreover, confronted with the possibility of strict en-
forcement of the Antidumping Act in raw steel products, foreign steel-
makers may shift from raw steel production to fabrication, which is not 
covered by the TPM. Domestic fabricators consequently will face in-
creased competition from foreign fabricators, some of whom may sell fab-
ricated steel at a price below the cost of producing the raw steel involved. 
Domestic steelmakers may also be injured if the trigger prices are set too 
low, thus allowing foreign steel to be sold at prices American manufac-
turers cannot match. Hardship in all of these cases to a proper party 
seems evident. 
Finality is properly the last of the three elements which must be bal-
anced to determine ripeness. The APA provides for judicial review of "fi-
nal agency action. " 108 The term "agency action" includes within its stat-
utory definition "an agency statement of general or particular applicabil-
ity and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy. " 109 The TPM should be treated as a final agency action, because 
steelmakers are encouraged to rely on the trigger prices in the course of 
business planning, 110 and the TPM is plainly an agency statement de-
signed to implement both law and policy within the meaning of the APA. 
Considered solely as a means of spurring an antidumping investigation, 
the TPM may not appear to be a final agency action, as producers are af-
fected only when the Treasury Department reaches a Tentative Determi-
nation of LTFV sales. This argument, however, ignores the significant 
economic effects on domestic steel fabricators and on both foreign and 
domestic steelmakers caused by the introduction of the TPM. Finality 
inafter cited as Memorandum], and Tarnished Shield: 'Trigger-Price' System to Help Steel 
Industry Triggers Much Dismay, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1978, at I, col. 6. 
• 00Granting review on the basis of hardship is supported by the APA provision permitting 
review of final agency actions for which there is no other adequate remedy,§ IO(c), 5 U .S.C. 
§ 704 (1976). National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d at 696. 
The test focuses on hardship to particular challengers and not on systemic effects. Vining, 
supra note 99, at 1503-04. Imposition of the TPM will both have general systemic effects and 
also place particular producers at an economic disadvantage prior to enforcement. Con-
sequently, the defects in the calculation of costs which Vining discerns in Abbott and both 
Toilet Goods cases are not present here. See Vining, supra note 99, at 1501-04. 
107See notes 122-130 and accompanying text infra. 
106A.P.A. § IO(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976). 
• 0•Section 2(g) of the A.P.A., 5 U .S.C. § 551(13) (1976) defines "agency action" to iriclµde 
the whole or part of an agency rule. "Rule" is further defined by§ 2(c) of the APA, 5 U .S.C. 
§ 551(4) as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability 
and future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy." 
110See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 5. 
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should be judged by the practical effects ofagency action, notjust by the 
direct effects on individual parties of enforcement activities. 111 In Na-
tional Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, the court held 
that a letter sent by the Administrator of the Wage-Hour Division in the 
Department of Labor in reply to a question by a trade association about 
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act was final agency action enti-
tling the trade association to judicial review. The court stated that the Su-
preme Court ''has found final action in a wide array of pronouncements 
and communications having the contemplation and likely consequence of 
'expected conformity. "'112 "Expected conformity" in steel pricing is an 
explicit goal in the Treasury's creation of the trigger system, so the TPM 
should be considered a final agency action. 
The issue of review ability is further complicated by a question of juris-
diction. Original jurisdiction of the United States District Courts involv-
ing customs matters, including antidumping duties, must be established 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1340. That section provides for jurisdiction of "any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress providing for ... revenue 
from imports or tonnage except matters within the jurisdiction of the Cus-
toms Court" (emphasis supplied). The Customs Court, under 28 U .S.C. 
§ 1582(a), has "exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions instituted by any 
person whose protest pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has 
been denied, in whole or part .... '' Such protests are governed by sec-
tion 516 of the Antidumping Act, as amended, 113 which applies exclu-
sively to challenges of appraised value, classification or the proper rate of 
duty imposed pursuant to the Antidumping Act, and challenges of an 
L TFV determination. 114 
In National Milk Producers Federation v. Shultz, 115 a federal district 
court, rather than the Customs Court, was found to have jurisdiction 
where the plaintiff was suing to force the Treasury Department to impose 
countervailing duties on imported dairy products pursuant to section 303 
of the Tariff Act of 1930. The complaint alleged that the Department had 
refused for six years to enforce the statute against EC dairy producers. 
After construing Hammond Lead to deny the Customs Court jurisdiction 
to hear protests by American manufacturers under section 1582, the dis-
trict court in National Milk Producers Federation held that section 1340 
conferred jurisdiction on the district courts.116 The.court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that the court in Hammond Lead had merely held 
countervailing duty protests to be unauthorized by section 516 and had 
not barred Customs Court jurisdiction. The district court stated that the 
unavailability ofreview under section 516 necessarily eliminated Customs 
111The issue of finality is to be determined "in a pragmatic way." National Automatic 
Laundiy and Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
112/d. at 698. 
11319 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
114 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516(a), (c), and (d) (Supp. V 1975). 
11 •372 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1974). 
116/d. at 747. 
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Courtjurisdiction under section 1582, "since that statutory provision un-
equivocally predicates jurisdiction on the existence of protests under the 
1930 Tariff Act." 11 7 
This conclusion is important in the context of pre-enforcement review 
of the TPM. One of the principal maxims of customs practice is that the 
Customs Court is without equity jurisdiction. 118 Thus, any declaratory or 
injunctive relief against imposition of the trigger price system can only 
come from federal district courts. This principle of jurisdiction was con-
firmed in Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 119 where the unavailability of 
Customs Court jurisdiction to review challenges to trade agreements 
negotiated between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the Re-
public of China, was held to confer jurisdiction on the District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York. 120 Because relief under section 516 is 
unavailable to parties challenging institution of the TPM, the Customs 
Court is divested of exclusive jurisdiction under section 1582 and such 
challenges may be considered by district courts with the power to grant 
adequate relief. 
v. EFFECTS OF THE TPM AND ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES 
The trigger price system is designed to leave untouched the statutory 
rights of all parties under the Antidumping Act. 121 Thus, a foreign steel 
producer selling in the United States below the applicable trigger price 
may challenge the Treasury's conclusion that sales are at "less than fair 
value." However, the protection afforded by this right may be illusory in 
practice. Trigger prices will be based on the best evidence available, 
which is the type of evidence required by the statutory enforcement pro-
visions .122 Consequently, the data used for antidumping investigations 
triggered through the TPM may well be the same data used in establishing 
the trigger. Indeed, the Solomon Report claim that the TPM will expedite 
antidumping investigations is founded on the advantage to be derived 
from the application of continually collected information on foreign and 
domestic steel production to LTFV determinations. 123 The trigger price 
will consequently reappear during the LTFV investigation as the legal 
117/d. 
11 "Vance, Proposed Legislation-Equity Power for the Customs Court, in THIRD ANNUAL 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT AP-
PEALS, May IO, 1976, 72 F.R.D. 239, 381, at 382 (1976). 
119566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 19n). 
120/d. at 399-401. See also Timken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221, 225-27 (D.C. Cir. 
1976)(holding that the United States District Courts have jurisdiction over antidumping 
complaints where Customs Court jurisdiction is unavailable). 
121See note 62 and accompanying text supra. 
122Compare Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 14 with 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1970). 
123See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 16. 
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standard for "fair value,"124 and will therefore set an effective minimum 
price for imports entering the United States steel market. 125 
The imposition of effective minimum prices for steel imports compels 
foreign producers to act as a steel export cartel. 126 Because the triggers 
are set at average cost rather than marginal cost, foreign producers who 
otherwise would have charged lower prices will expropriate monopoly 
profits on sales. 127 Moreover, a system which sets de facto minimum 
prices will protect inefficient foreign producers from competition for the 
import market.128 The TPM prices are calculated from the average costs 
of production for the most efficient foreign steelmakers, currently the 
Japanese. As a result, an efficient Japanese firm may not sell in the United 
States market below its average total cost of production without violating 
the trigger price system even where marginal cost pricing would dictate a 
lower price. Less efficient producers, such as the EC steelmakers who 
sell at a higher price than the Japanese concerns even while dumping, may 
continue to sell below their average total costs of production. Because the 
Treasury will not initiate an antidumping investigation unless such sales 
are below the relevant trigger, 129 less efficient producers may escape ad-
ditional duties despite their continued dumping. In addition, the higher 
prices charged by efficient producers to escape antidumping penalties will 
permit less efficient producers to capture a larger share of the import 
market due to the decrease in price differentials. The TPM therefore real-
locates economic advantage among foreign producers. 
To counter the adverse impact of the TPM, the most efficient foreign 
steel producers may concentrate on exporting fabricated steel products 
and reduce their exports of raw steel. 13° Fabricated steel products are 
outside the purview of the trigger price system, and enforcement of the 
Antidumping Act against such products when their prices do not fully in-
corporate production costs must proceed under the existing statutory re-
' 24See 43 Fed. Reg. 2031 (Jan. 13, 1978) (Dept. of the Treasury, Welded Stainless Steel 
Pipe and Tubing from Japan: Antidumping-Withholding of Appraisment Notice and Exclu-
sion from Antidumping Investigation). 
' 25See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 559-63. While the FTC Staff Report considers 
only legally enforceable minimum prices, use of the same standard of' 'fair value'' in L TFV 
determinations and the prospect of strict enforcement in steel cases combine to set a refer-
ence standard equivalent in economic effect to a de jure minimum price. See Memorandum, 
supra note 105, at 16-17. Cf. Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (order invalid for 
failure to meet rate-making procedures where stating rates based on newly promulgated 
formula would be acceptable but rates not conforming to the new formula would be sus-
pended and investigated). 
126FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 560. 
127"To the extent that the Treasury price exceeds what the exporter would have charged, 
the exporter appropriates the higher profits on its sales." Id. 
128Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 18. 
129/d. See also Hearings, supra note 5, at 229 (testimony of Robert H. Mundheim, General 
Counsel, Department of the Treasury), and the discussion of the Treasury's antidumping 
investigation of Western European steel in note 67 supra. 
130Hearings, supra note 5, at 187 (testimony of John H. Lyons, General President, Inter-
national Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers); The Opposition 
Grows to Reference Pricing, Bus. WEEK, April 10, 1978, at 30. 
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gime and cannot share in the administrative advantages of the TPM. 
Domestic fabricators will therefore be twice disadvantaged by imposition 
of the TPM; those fabricators who rely on foreign produced raw steel will 
pay more for their supplies, and all domestic fabricators will face in-
creased competition due to the shift in production towards fabrication by 
foreign steel makers responding to the TPM. 
As the previous discussion demonstrates, establishing the TPM as a 
procedural system for prosecution effectively reallocates economic op-
portunities among the interested parties even before enforcement. 131 
There are two other alternative procedures for controlling imports that 
the Administration could have used, each of which would allocate 
economic opportunity differently. The first alternative was the imposition 
of quantitative restrictions on the importation of foreign steel. 132 Quan-
titative restrictions may arguably be imposed unilaterally by the United 
States consistent with its responsibilities under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 33 Although quantitative restrictions are gen-
erally outlawed by the GA TT, 134 they may be applied for national security 
reasons135 or after receipt of a waiver by the GATT.1 36 Additionally, the 
GATT "escape clause" provisions may authorize such import restraints 
131See Transcript of White House Briefing by Anthony M. Solomon, Under Secretary of 
the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, at 5 (Dec. 6, J 9TI). One domestic fabricator dependent 
on foreign-produced raw steel has alleged a 30% increase in its costs for imported steel since 
the system has gone into effect, but before enforcement actions have been brought by the 
Treasury. Bus. WEEK, April 10, 1978, at 30. See also Steel Heads for a Comeback, Bus. 
WEEK, April 10,1978 at 30, 31, and Memorandum, supra note 105, at 16-17, 43-44, alleging 
that foreign steel producers immediately upon promulgation of the TPM have refused to sell 
below the relevant trigger, and that the plaintiff fabricator in that case will pay approxi-
mately $700,000 more during the second quarter of 1978 as a consequence. 
132Quantitative restrictions may be imposed unilaterally under U.S. law pursuant to the 
"escape clause" provision of the 1974 Trade Act,§§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 
(Supp. V 1975). Under these procedures, presidential institution of quantitative restraints 
must be preceded by a finding of the International Trade Commission (ITC) that "an article 
is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial 
cause of serious injury, or the treat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article 
like or directly competitive with the imported article." See §§ 20J(b)(l), 202(c), and 
203(a)(3), 19 U.S.C. §§ 225 J(b)(l), 2252(c), and 2253(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975). A similar proce-
dure is required for the negotiation of Orderly Marketing Agreements with foreign countries 
limiting imports. § 203(a)(4), 19 U .S.C. § 2253(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975). Whether negotiation by 
the U.S. of a Voluntary Restraint Agreement directly with a foreign producer may be under-
taken outside the framework of the escape clause is an open question. See J. JACKSON, 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 676-78 (1977). For an exam-
ple of a Voluntary Restraint Agreement, see Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 
506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Presidential action under the escape clause is open to con-
gressional veto in the form of a concurrent resolution if it differs in any respect from ITC 
recommendations. The effect of such congressional action is to establish the ITC recom-
mendation as the chosen form of import relief.§§ 203(b) and (c), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253(b) and 
(c) (Supp. V 1975). 
133General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, date done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. parts 5 
& 6, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GA TT]. For a current listing of all 
GAIT protocols and agreements, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT. 
888-97 (1969). 
134GA TT, supra note 133, at art. XI. 
135/d. at art. XX!. 
136/d. at art. XXV(5). 
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where unforeseen developments and the effect of obligations incurred 
under the GATT together cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers .137 
Quantitative restraints also may be imposed through voluntary agree-
ments restricting imports. These agreements, often motivated by the 
threat of unilateral actions, are known as Orderly Marketing Agreements 
or Voluntary Restraint Agreements. 138 Such mutual accommodations are, 
however, prohibited by the GATT limitations on export controls. Even if 
the imposition of quantitative restrictions does not violate the GA TT, 
foreign countries are authorized to take retaliatory trade action where ad-
versely affected. 139 
Quantitative restrictions effectively create, as do minimum prices, a 
steel export cartel and thus generate monopoly profits. As a party to the 
international agreements creating voluntary trade restraints, the United 
States has some flexibility in determining who will capture these profits, 
but foreign concerns rather than the Treasury are in practice the usual 
beneficiaries. Moreover, the possible benefits from government alloca-
tion of these monopoly profits seem to be outweighed by the costs of po-
tential retaliatory trade action by other countries. In addition, quantita-
tive restraints completely break the link between domestic and world steel 
prices, and allow inefficient foreign domestic producers to retain their 
share of the market. 14° Finally, domestic fabricators face the same two-
pronged attack on their market when quantitative restraints are imposed 
as they presently confront under the TPM regime.141 
The second alternative means of controlling steel imports would have 
been the introduction of increased tariff rates on foreign steel products. 142 
Because most tariffs in the United States are imposed ad valorem, an in-
creased rate does not affect the competitive position of foreign producers 
in the steel import market. In consequence, the levy of a tariff increase 
would not serve to protect less efficient Western European steel concerns 
in price competition with the more efficient Japanese steelmakers for the 
American import market. A steel export cartel is not created, and the rev-
enues generated by the tariff increase can be captured by the United 
States Treasury. 143 Fabricators, however, once again remain outside the 
137/d. at art. XIX. 
138See note 132 supra. 
139Retaliation for action taken under the aegis of the GA IT escape clause, art. XIX, may 
take the form of suspension of substantially equivalent trade concessions and obligations or, 
in special cas.es, suspension of such concessions or obligations as may be necessary to pre-
vent or remedy injury. Id. at art. XIX(3). Retaliation for actions which contravene the 
GAIT, or impair or nullify obligations incurred under the GAIT, must be authorized by the 
Contracting Parties to the GA IT. 
140See generally Bell, Analysis of Protective Measures, in I COMMISSION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 421, 431-34 (1971) and Metzger,hefu,y and Market 
Disruption From Impons, in id. 167, 168-73 (1971). 
141See text following note 130 supra. 
142Tariff increases in these circumstances must meet the requirements of United States 
law discussed in note 132 supra. 
143See Stem, Tariffs and Other Measures of Trade Control: A Survey of Recent Develop-
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protective barrier erected by the increased tariff. 
Increases in existing tariff rates, to avoid U.S. violation of the GAIT, 
must come within the same escape clause, waiver, or national security 
provisions as quantitative restrictions. 144 Retaliatory trade action by 
foreign countries is thus a possibility to be considered by decisionmakers. 
Consequently, a tariff increase, while less destructive to competitive 
equilibrium than the TPM, shares with quantitative import restraints the 
problem of international trade retaliation. Because the trigger system is, 
at least in form, mereJy an administrative device for managing investiga-
tion resources, amounting to stricter enforcement of existing law, it does 
not touch off retaliatory action by foreign states under the GA TT. In addi-
tion, the TPM is less likely to be seen by foreign states as a protectionist 
measure than either quantitative restrictions or increased tariffs. These 
considerations provide a strong incentive to use the TPM as the principal 
component of the Administration response to the current steel crisis. 
Since the TPM involves self-initiated limitation of administrative dis-
cretion, the Administration's policy choice may be perceived as circum-
venting "the checks and balances of both the U.S. Congress and the in-
ternational negotiations for trade liberalization. " 145 Judicial inquiry into 
the TPM may not be based on the GATT,146 because the TPM is not 
within the legal jurisdiction of the Agreement. Further, the TPM may be 
insulated from judicial review entirely, as discussed earlier. Of course, as 
an important element of the U.S. regulatory scheme for steel imports, the 
TPM clearly comes within the purview of multilateral trade negotiations 
proceeding under the auspices of the GA TT. Consequently, the system is 
sure to receive international scrutiny during these ongoing negotiations. 
The issue of congressional accountability raises a more substantial 
question. Both quantitative restrictions and increased tariffs would in all 
probability be exposed to congressional scrutiny under section 203 of the 
1974 Trade Act, which empowers Congress to veto presidential actions to 
provide import relief. 147 Section 203, part of the escape clause provisions 
of the Trade Act, is applicable only where tariffs, quotas, and other im-
port restraints are at issue. 148 The TPM, because it does not implicate 
legal rights and is a procedural response to the steel problem, is not sub-
ments, 11 J. ECON. LIT. 589 (1973). 
144See notes 134-139 supra. 
145 FfC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 560. 
146A GATI working party which examined the issue concluded that reference prices are 
not covered by art. XVI of the GATI as an indirect subsidy to domestic industry. GATI, 
BASIC INsrRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 188, 191 (9th Supp. 1961). See J. 
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATI 385-86 (1969). 
147Under § 203 of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U .S.C. § 2253 (Supp. V 1975), if the President 
recommends import relief which differs from the ITC recommendations under§ 201(d)(l), 
19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(l) (Supp. V 1975), he must state the reasons for such differences in a 
document transmitted to Congress. §§ 203(b)(I) and (b)(2), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253(b)(l) and 
(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). The recommendations of the ITC, rather than those of the President, 
will take effect if both Houses of Congress within a ninety day period adopt a concurrent 
resolution disapproving the presidential determination.§ 203(c)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l) 
(Supp. V 1975). 
148 1974 Trade Act, § 203(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. V 1975). 
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ject to section 203 inquiry. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the ele-
ments which enter into the Treasury Department's balance between dis-
cretion and rule, in the absence of direct congressional accountability and 
the possible absence of judicial review. 
VJ. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Administrative discretion exists when an agency is free to make a 
choice among possible courses of action, including the choice to do noth-
ing at all. 149 The trigger price system identifies those cases in which the 
Treasury Department will do nothing to investigate alleged violations of 
the law. Having concluded that the Treasury is not legally accountable to 
Congress nor perhaps to the courts for its failure to investigate, the essen-
tial fairness of enforcement of the Antidumping Act can be ensured only 
by other means of checking arbitrary and unjust exercise of the Trea-
sury's discretion. 150 
Where there are no rules governing agency discretion, agency decisions 
are often the result of conflicting political and economic forces. 151 The 
promulgation of the TPM, while exempted from APA procedures on 
rulemaking, is in effect the promulgation of rules structuring investigatory 
discretion. These rules, guided by the policy of restricting antidumping 
investigations to cases where the sale price of a raw steel product is below 
the cost of production by the most efficient steelmakers, 152 are displayed 
and are to be revised publicly. Consequently, the most important instru-
ments identified by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, a well-known propo-
nent of circumscribing official discretion, as essential in controlling dis-
cretionary authority153 are employed in the construction of the trigger 
price system. However, in the absence ofa showing that such devices are 
effective, the mere existence of these instruments of control does not 
guarantee adequate regulation of Treasury discretion. 
149DAVIS, supra note 70, at 4. 
150Discretion, and particularly selective enforcement, is integral to the effective function-
ing of administrative agencies. However, because the bulk of administrative activity is either 
judicially unreviewable or judicially unreviewed, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TEXT 88 (3d ed. 1972), this power may be exercised in an arbitrary and unjust manner. 
Courts have devised tools for the judicial structuring and control of this descretion, see K. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 607 (1976), but much government activity 
is still uncontrolled by the courts. Consequently, legislative oversight, interest group input, 
and political accountability must be considered as means of controlling discretion. This arti-
cle will not attempt to identify the effect of relying on institutions other than the judiciary for 
control of administrative discretion. It is clear, however, that such institutions will structure 
discretionary authority in line with their own interests. See T. Lowt, THE END OF 
. LIBERALISM (1969). 
151Wright, Review: Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L. J. 575, 577 (1972). 
' 52See Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 18. 
153Davis has identified several instruments for the purpose of controlling the exercise of 
discretionary authority: open plans, open policy statements, open roles, open findings, open 
precedent, and fair informal procedures. DAVIS, supra note 70, at 99-120. 
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At the present time, there has been little enforcement of the Antidump-
ing Act in steel cases by means of the TPM. 154 Therefore, evidence of 
control over the exercise of discretion by the Treasury must be garnered 
by examining the events leading up to institution of the trigger system. 
Executive action to assist the steel industry was prompted in 1977 by 
strong congressional pressures, by the combined efforts of labor and the 
industry to focus national attention on the problems of steel, and by the 
filing of nineteen antidumping cases by the steel industry .155 The principal 
criticisms of the existing scheme for enforcing the Antidumping Act were 
delay, product specificity and abuse of discretion, 156 and the TPM was 
constructed to remedy these problems. In designing the TPM around the 
cost of production standard, the Task Force accepted specific industry 
claims that domestic steel concerns were fully competitive in the absence 
of below-cost sales by foreign steel producers. Following publication of 
the Solomon Report, Administration witnesses appeared at congressional 
hearings to discuss and explain the proposed solutions.1 57 These events, 
taken together, evidence both political and interest group input into the 
process of establishing the TPM. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The TPM was advanced by the Solomon Report as a response to the 
current steel crisis. Because the system involves self-initiated restraint of 
administrative discretion, the availability of pre-enforcement judicial re-
view is problematic. While the legislative history of the 1974 Trade Act 
and the language of section 516 argue against reviewability of the TPM, 
the standard for prohibiting review established in Abbott is so strict that a 
court may review the trigger system if it is alleged to constitute an abuse 
of discretion. 
In its construction of the TPM, the Treasury Department was appar-
ently subject to political and interest group checks against the institution 
154See Memorandum, supra note 105, for material filed as part of a civil action brought by 
a steel fabrication company, Davis Walker (:orp., against the Secretary of the Treasury. On 
the basis of the complaint in that case, the U.S. district court issued a temporary order bar-
ring the Treasury from enforcing trigger prices on wire rod. Bus. WEEK, April 10, 1978 at 30. 
The complaint brought by Davis Walker Corp. alleged that establishment of the TPM ex-
ceeded the Treasury's statutory authority under the Antidumping Act. It further claimed 
that the TPM failed to comply with the rulemaking procedures of the APA and was "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with Jaw, within the 
meaning of 5 U .S.C. § 706," in publishing trigger prices for steel wire rod where (i) no other 
semi-finished steel products are included in the system, (ii) no trigger prices are imposed on 
any finished steel products, and (iii) the inclusion of steel wire rod in the TPM will not ac-
complish the purpose of the Antidumping Act where domestic steel production capacity is 
inadequate to supply the domestic market for steel wire. See Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, Civil Action No. 78-042 (D.D.C. 
1978). 
155N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 19n at 51, col. 4. 
158See note 41 and accompanying text supra. 
157See Hearings, supra note 5. 
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of potentially arbitrary discretion in steel antidumping actions. If judicial 
review is unavailable, however, steps should be taken to ensure direct 
congressional accountability. Moreover, because the level at which the 
trigger price is set determines the effectiveness of the system, there 
should be public participation in construction of the methodology used in 
establishing the actual prices. By instituting the TPM, which is essentially 
nothing more than open policy and procedure for initiating investigations, 
the Treasury has begun the process of establishing accountability in the 
administration of the antidumping laws. 158 Whether the Treasury will 
continue in this direction remains to be seen. 
-Mark Alan Kantor 
158Cf. Wright, supra note 151, at 578-79. 
ERRATA 
The following corrections should be made in Volume 11, Issue 1 : 
Page 90. The last line of text should read: 
"eliminating the abuses which have been disclosed in recent months." 
Page 116. The first paragraph of text should read: 
''Courts adopting the modern majority position have differed over 
whether the Tucker Act supplements, displaces, or provides an alterna-
tive to the theories of recoupment and set-off. 48 A few older decisions 
held that the $10,000 limit of the Tucker Act applies to counterclaims for 
recoupment or set-off. Such an interpretation denies the district courts 
jurisdiction over a valid counterclaim in excess of $10,000 when the de-
fendant could otherwise recoup or set-off a claim regardless of the 
amount." 
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